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VOTERS, BUREAUCRATS .AND LEGISLATORS: 
!1 ' 
A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY 
by Morris P. Fiorina and Roger G. Noll* 
ABSTRACT 
The claim that government is excessively bureaucratic 
can be interpreted as an assertion about inefficient factor 
proportions in the production of public go0ds. The rational 
choice theory of electoral competition is extended in this paper 
to include the election of representatives from separate 
districts, ombudsman activities by legislators, self-interested 
bureaucrats and production functions for public activities that 
have bureaucratic and nonbureaucrat.ic arguments. If• the demand 
for public goods grows exogenously through time, the model 
predicts increasingly inefficient factor proportions yet a 
growing advantage for incumbent legislators when they seek 
reelection. 
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A connnon criticism of the modern state is that it has 
become excessively bureaucratized. Agencies which provide public 
goods and services supposedly entangle citizens in red tape, 
thereby imposing significant costs on individuals and businesses. 
Yet despite this criticism, democracies the world over continue 
to legislate new bureaucracies and to expand old ones. 
The obvious question suggested by this state of affairs 
is how excessive bureaucracy can arise and persist in a democracy 
despite its apparent unpopularity. In principle, several 
explanations are available. One is that democratic government may 
be a charade; the welfare of citizens may bear no cdnsistent 
relation to the policies pursued by government, even in the long 
run. An9ther is that bureaucratization of public organizations 
may be the most efficient mechanism for providing public goods and 
services. Complaints about bureaucracy may be akin to discontent 
about the impossibility of a free lunch. 
A third possibility is examined in _this paper: some 
government institutions create incentives which lead self-interested, 
rational individuals to behave in a manner that causes excessively 
bureaucratized government. This hypothesis is examined here within 
the contexts of a simple economic model of utility-maximizing 
voters, vote-maximizing politicians and bureaucracy-maximizing 
agencies. The model incorporates in a rudimentary fashion the 
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effects of several connnon (but not universal) governmental institutions : 
.One is the practice of dividing the electorate into separate 
constituencies, each of which is represen�ed in the legislative body 
by one legislator. Another is a system of taxation in which citizens 
pay taxes that are not based solely on the value they place on 
government activity. A third is a political system in which the 
bureaucracy is separate from the legislature and members of the 
legislative body both act as legislators and as ombudsmen for 
constituents who become ensnared in the bureaucracy. A fourth is 
a governmental structure in which seniority and government experience 
affect the ability of a legislator to perform the ombudsman role. 
In sum, the model depicts a society that is governed by an 
autonomous, decentralized, unicameral legislature, th� members of 
which are elected by plurality vote in districts with a single 
representative. This hypothetical institution is patterned after 
the U. S. House of Representatives or the French House of Deputies, 
although the model does not incorporate the strong, independent 
executive that is present in these countries. 
The principal conclusion derived from the model is that 
all of the institutions included in the model contribute to 
. eJtcessive bureaucratization, even if agencies 9o not seek to
maximize societal expenditures on bureaucratic institutions. 
Obviously, the latter behavior can exacerbate the problem, 
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I. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis that follows is based upon the assumption that 
a production function for a government activity is a theoretically 
and empirically meaningful concept and, moreover, that the arguments 
of such a function are separable into those that constitute the 
bureaucratic aspects of the activity of an agency and those that 
represent resources used in the physical provision of the government 
good, This assumption is controversial. Olson (1973) argues that 
government activities production efficiency cannot be accurately 
measured, and Wildavsky (1974) contends that agencies use natural 
informational advantages in dealing with the legislature on 
budgetary issues. Nevertheless, the assumption will be maintained 
since without it, one cannot address the question of whether 
governmental organizations are excessi�ely bureaucratized. 
Bureaucratization within an organization can contribute 
to economic efficiency if it allows an organization to realize the 
economies of division of labor while retaining a common organizational 
objective among employees. Weber (1946) characterizes the 
principles that underlie modern public bureaus as: (1) Hire and 
promote. employees on the basis of performance; (2) Assign employees 
clear,duties and responsibilities; (3) Keep formal records of the 
activities of each member of the organization; and (4) Arrange the 
organization hierarchically, branched according to organizational 
functions and vertically segmented according to the degree and 
breadth of managerial responsibility, in order to facilitate 
communication, personnel assessment, and unambiguous assignment of 
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responsibility for each activity of the organization and for its 
overall performance, 
Associated with these principles are potential problems. 
Clients of the organization may not know who has responsibility for 
the particular problems that they face. Or, instructions to an 
employee regarding duties and responsibilities may not cover the 
particular problem of a client, As a result, the employee may 
respond ineffectively to a demand for services, 
Bureaucratic costs consist ,of the time and resources 
expended to overcome these problems. Some bureaucratic costs are 
internal to the bureaucracy, such as the costs of collecting, 
storing and analyzing data about the work activities of employees, 
and of communicat.ing and enforcing organizational policies from 
the highest managerial personnel to lower�level employees, Other 
bureaucratic costs are born by the clients of the organization, 
such as the costs associated with discovering the appropriate entry 
point to the bureaucracy and providing the information the bureaucracy 
requires for its own internal maintenance purposes. Bureaucracy 
is excessive if it exce,eds the amount that, combined with the 
other expenses of the organization, minimizes the total costs 
(jncluding costs born by clients) of providing a given amount of 
services. 
In the theoretical model to follow, the leg�slature 
performs several functions. It selects the amount of public goods 
that will be provided and the technology that will be used to 
produce public goods. In addition, the members o f  the legislature 
assist citizens in dealing with the bureaucracy. The oversight 
function of the legislature gives it influence with bureaucrats 
and information on how the bureaucracy works, both of which are 
potentially of value to citizens who come in contact with the 
1/ agency.- Finally, the legislature selects the taxation system 
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);/ �he argument in this paper abstracts from the possibility that 
the legislature �ay adopt a committee structure to divide 
responsibility for acquiring various types of public goods. 
While the committee.system is potentially of great importance, 
reciprocity rules vitiate its significance for the particular 
purposes of this paper (see Weingast (1976)).
that will be used to finance gover�ment activity. 
A key feature of legislative bodies is the difference 
between the legislator' s roles as a facilitator and as a participant 
in formulating public policies. In deciding on taxation, 
expenditures, the technology of the public sector, and general 
public policy, the legislature is a majority rule institution. 
Consequently, a legislator is not likely to have much of an impact 
on legislative outcomes. On the other hand, if legislators are 
elected by district, each legislator will be one of few potential 
sources of. facilitating services. Indeed, in a unicameral system 
with district representation, each legislator is a local monopolist 
in supplying these services, Moreover, in providing bureaucratic 
unsticking services, the legislator acts independently, rather 
than by acquiring majority support among other legislators. 
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co·nsequently, a legislator is fully accountable to the voter for 
facilitation services, but not fully responsible for the policy 
outcomes of the legislature. The result is a .Prisoner's dilemma 
outcome for voters. 
:0:. THE :FORMAL MODEL 
Economic models of voting behavior hypothesize that 
citizens decide which candidate to support by comparing the 
personal benefits that they expect to receive as a result of 
the election of each of the opposing candidates. Citizens are 
assumed to integrate decisions about political and economic 
activities in selecting a most preferred combination of consumer 
goods and public policies from among the· available alternatives. 
J:n the model to follow, the ordering of these alternatives is 
represented by a utility function over two commodities (one 
pr;l.vate, one public) for each co.nsumer, written as: 
th where (i, j) .is an index.over all citizens, representing the i 
consumer in the j th constituency (i = 1, n and J= 1, m), ziJ is ·the 
consumption of the private good by (i, j) , Kj is the amount of the 
public good proposed by the legislator of constituency j', and K 
is the amount of the public good that will be acquired, given the 
positions, Kj, of all of the legislators that will be elected. 
For purposes of this analysis, the essential feature of K is that 
government provides it outside of the market system, not that it 
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is of necessity collectively· consumeQ. It is assumed that Uij > O 
z 
and uij > 0, and that zij and K are continously variable and 
nonnegative, 
Each consumer has positive income yij to be allocated 
among purchases of the private good, taxation (tij) that is used· 
for acquiring the-public good and providing facilitation services, 
and the expense of dealing with the government bureaucracy. 
Letting all other prices be relative to the price of the private 
good, the budget of a citizen is represented as: 
where C represents the external costs to (i, j) of a bureaucracy of 
size B, given facilitation services in the amount Fij by the
. . b citizen' s legislator who has bureaucratic influence I . •  The J 
influence of a legislator in providing effective facilitation 
services is affected by the party identification, seniority and 
experience of the legislator, so that for each candidate it is a 
parameter rather than a variable under the candidate's control. 
The shape of the bureaucratic cost function is assumed 
to exhibit a positive and rising marginal cost of bureaucracy, 
e. g. CB> 0 and CBB > O, and a positive but falling marginal benefit 
of facilitation, or CF< 0 and CFF > 0. An increment of F is 
assumed to reduce marginal bureaucratic costs, e. g. CBF < 0, 
!qfluence is assumed to reduce bureaucratic costs as well, but 
with· falling marginal effect, and to make facilitating services 
more effective. Hence, CI< 0, CI!> O, CBI< O, and CFI < O. 
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Total tax collections from all citizens must exactly match 
all government expenditures: 
l . ti.= PbB +P X+ Pf l Fi, i, j J x i, j j 
wh�re B and X represent the amount of bureaucratic and other inputs, 
respectively, to the provision of the public good, and Pb' PX and
Pf are the relative costs of B, X and Fij' Finally, the transformation 
of inputs B and x· into output of the public good is written as a 
production function: 
K = f (B , X), 
which has the properties that more input y�elds more output (e. g. 
fB > 0 and fX > 0) , and that the law of diminishing returns is 
satisfied (e.g. fBB < 0 and fXX < O). 
Social Welfare Maximization 
Assuming that society seeks to maximize the sum of 
individual utility functions, a philosopher-king would solve the 
following constrained maximization problem: 
'\' ij Maximize: l U (z . . , K) 
i, j 1.J 
Subject to: K = f (B, X) 
z,. + l.J 
With y and A adjoined to these constraints as Lagrange multipliers, 
the first-order conditions for a maximum are: 
I uij + Y = o 
i,j K 
uij - A 0 
z 
0 
0 
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for all i, j 
for all j 
0 
0 for all i, j 
The first two .equations are the familiar conditions of consumption 
efficiency, When combined, and using (4) or (5) to interpret the 
ratio of the Lagrange multipliers, (1) and (2) require that the 
ratio of the effect on total welfare of an increment of the P.ublic 
good to. the value to a particular citizen of an increment of the 
private good equals the ratio of the costs of those increments. 
Equation (3), assuming that the income constraint is binding (so 
A 1' 0) and that the costs of bureaucracy are positive, reduces to a 
requirement that legislator influence on the bureaucracy be 
sufficiently great that no further increase in influence can reduce 
bureaucratic costs (e.g. CI= 0), This result arises from the
absence of a cost of increased influence in the structure of the 
model. Since influence is a parameter to the legislators, this 
condition is best interpreted as indicating the optimality of 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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professional legislators of the controlling party, assuming that 
such a condition is .consistent with·the optimal choice of K and the 
tax rule, In anr event, some influence, even if it were costly to 
create, would emerge from this type of model since informational 
fac�litation services in a complex bureau can, in principle at 
least, reduce total societal costs .arising from public goods. 
Equations (4) and (5) together yield the condition for 
production efficiency of the public good, namely that the ratio of 
the marginal productivities of the two inputs equal the ratio of 
their social costs. The social cost of X is merely its price; 
however, the social cost of B includes external costs: 
p x 
Condition (6), assuming A 1' O, provides a condition fot efficient 
u�e of facilitation services, Rearranging the term in parentheses, 
the condition becomes: 
(7) 
(8) 
or that each citizen should acquire facilitation services up to the 
point at which the cost of the last increment equals its 
contribution to reducing private bureaucratic costs. 
Total differentiation of (6), with I� assumed 
constrained with cancellation and rearrangement, yields: 
(9) 
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Since in the ratio on the right side of (9) CBF and the ratio 
itself are negative, the left-hand side must be positive. Thus, 
a change in conditions that causes an ·increase in Fij will lead to 
more bureaucracy. This can happen through substitution of B for 
X, holding K constant, and through increased production of K. 
Letting dB* represent the substitution term, 
dB = dB* + � dK, 
which, when substituted into (9) and rearranged, provides: 
(!�
*
) 
The sign of the relation between F and K, then, is positive unless 
the substitution of B for X declines as K increases, and does so 
by an amount sufficient to offset the first term on the right 
side of (11). dF In general, the sign of dK depends on the shape of 
the production function for K, but growing K will lead to increased 
facilitation services unless, at higher K, the optimal amount of 
B is actually less than at lower amounts. 
dB observing that, because dF is positive, 
dB ij only if dK is negative, which, from (10), 
This can be seen by 
dFij 
dK can be negative 
requires that 
dB* < _ 11! 1 
dK ClK = - f • Since this case is implausible, if an ·external B 
factor such as growth in income or technical progress in producing 
K causes an increase in the quantity of K produced so, too, will. it 
cause increasing bureaucracy and facilitation services. Growing 
bureaucracy and increasing provision of facilitation services, then, 
(10) 
(11) 
can be expected in a growing economy, even if it operates efficiently. 
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Decentralized Decisions 
For the purposes of this paper, a decentralized system 
refers to a society in which competitive mar.kets allocate private 
goods and productive resources, and majority-rule elections, in 
which all citizens receive a vote, select legisl.ators. Candidates 
for the legislature compete for office by offering voters positions 
on public issues in this case, the amount of public good to be 
acquired and how it will be produced -- and an amount of facilitation 
services. The effectiveness of the candidate in carrying out 
promises of either type depends in part on the candidate's tenure 
in office. 
Each voter/consumer decides which candidate to vote for 
by examining the welfare implications of competing platforms and 
selecting the one promising the voter the greatest individual 
w(!.lfare. k With a probability p., a voter's legislator will be the J . 
deciding vote (median legislator) in the legislature, in.which 
case the maximization problem faced by the voter is.: 
Maximize: 
Subject to: Kj f(B,X) 
With prob.ab-ility (1- p�), the voter will face the same maximization J 
problem except that K, B and X will be beyond the influence of the 
legislator and, therefore, the voter. k 
. 
As long as pj is positive, 
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and Fij and zij are selected after K is determined, the likelihood 
that a voter will prefer a particular candidate will increase as 
Kj moves closer to the most preferred value. This is assured as 
long as candidates offer two contingent values of Fij' one in case 
K is supplied, the other should Kj be selected. 
According to the rational choice theory of elections, if 
citizen (i,j) is the swing vote (median voter) in the constituency 
and if no candidate possesses an intrinsic advantage in influence, 
owing to incumbency or party identification, the equilibrium outcome 
of a competitive election will be the solution to the constrained 
utility maximization problem in which all variables are in control 
of the median voter (i,j) in the constituency of the median 
legislator}./ 
J:./ The analysis in this section presumes familiarity with the 
theoretical literature on electoral competition with vote-
maximizing politicians and rational voters. See, for example, 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962); Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook 
(1970) and Downs (1957). 
The contingent event that .gives the median voter control 
over K, B and X can produce no worse an outcome than if these 
variables are fixed; hence, all other things being equal, the 
median voter will pref er values of K
j 
that are closer to the optimal 
value, Consequently, the equilibrium campaign strategy for a 
candidate is to offer median voter (i,j) an optimal value for Kj. 
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To complete the model, the nature of taxation must be 
specified, Taxes are assumed to be based on principles thst make 
t�em not wholly efficient and incentive compatible in the sense of 
Groves and Ledyard (1976) . For the sake of simplicity, each 
citizen is assumed to pay an equal share in the cost of government; 
however, the qualitative results of the following analysis depend 
only on the fact that facilitation services by legislators are not 
purchased as used, but instead are financed from general tax revenues, 
Thus, one of the two utility-maximization problems that are solved 
for the median voter becomes: 
Maximize: 
Subject to: f (B,X) 
zij + C (B,F . .  ,I�) + .l_(P X + PbB +Pf l·Fij). l.J J nm x i,j 
The first-order conditions for a solution to this problem are: 
uij + Y K o. 
Uij -'A= O. z 
b Pb -A(CB(B,F .. ,Ij
) + -) - yfB iJ nm 
o. 
-A(CF (B,Fij
'I�) +pf) O.
nm 
o. 
o. 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
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The second maximization problem is the same as the first, except 
. K, B and X are fixed. The first-order conditions for this problem 
are equations (13), (16) and (17). The solutions, of course, 
differ in the two problems because the values of K, B and X are 
different in these three equations. 
If income constrains utility maximization, condition (17) 
requires that the elected candidate have maximal influence with the 
bureaucracy as long as bureaucratic costs are positive. If 
incumbency and membership in the majority party affect influence 
with the bureaucracies, only a candidate possessing these 
characteristics can offer voters an optimum platform. Furthermore, 
an optimum platform must obtain only under the assumption that 
enough candidates possessing these cl)aracteristics are in the race 
to assure that the voter can pick the optimal value for the other 
variables as well. 
Condition (16) can be rearranged, again 11ssuming ;\ <f O, 
to provide the following requirement with respect to Fij: 
b = -
pf CF(B,Fij'Ij) nm
This differs from the welfare-maximizing condition in (8) by the 
term nm on the right side of the equation. The result is a well-
known consequence of "externalizing the internality" by financing 
a private good (here facilitation services) from a general tax. 
Given the conditions on CF and CFF' a decentralized system results 
in more extensive use of facilitating services than is optimally 
efficient, The magnitude of the inefficiency depends upon 
(18) 
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differences between the systems in the amount of B that is used 
in producing public goods • 
Conditions (14) and (15) provide the equilibrium factor 
proportions when K is in control of the voter, yielding: 
Expression (7), establishing the welfare-maximizing condition, 
differs from (19) in that the second term of the numerator of the 
right-hand side of (19) has been multiplied by nm, the number of 
citizens, whereas in (7) it is the sum of the private bureaucratic 
costs over all citizens, While this can introduce distortions, 
they are created by the taxation system, which affects choices of 
B and X differentially because not all of. the costs of B are
paid by the government out of tax revenues. The direction of the
distortion depends upon whether the median voter faces bureaucratic 
costs that are higher or lower than average. 
Combining the inference drawn from (18) with (19) 
produces another distortion that always works to produce excessive 
bureaucracy. Since Fij exceeds the optimal value, the function C 
takes on a value that is closer to zero than is optimal, 
At the equilibrium value for B in the welfare-maximizing 
problem, (19) would not be an equality since the right-hand side 
would be too small. Equality could be restored by increasing B by 
producing more K and substituting B for X , with the distribution 
between these two actions dependent on the shapes of the production 
and bureaucratic cost functions. 
(19) 
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Conditions (12) and (13) provide the equilibrium conditions 
for the relative consumption of public and private goods when the 
voter controls K. Since , from (14) or (15), -y/� is the marginal 
cost of public goods and by hypothesis unity is the marginal cost 
of private goods, (12) and (13) together require that the ratio of 
marginal utilities. be equal to the ratio of marginal costs. Since 
excessive use of facilitation services lowers the private costs of 
bureaucracy, the resulting equilibrium involves excessive consumption 
of public goods, 
If incumbency or party membership are permitted to affect 
the influence of a candidate in providing facilitation services , 
the competitive equilibrium value of K
j 
will not necessarily be
proposed by any candidate. An incumbency or party advantage with 
regard to influence enters the model in the following ways, If , 
b b r
jl 
exceed� I
j2 
and candidate 1 matches candidate 2 on all other 
variables (K,B ,X and Fij
), the first makes the welfare of (i, j) 
higher because candidate 1 will have reduced the expenditures of 
(i ,j) by the amount C(B ,Fij
'I�2) - C (B ,Fij'I�1) whether K is or is
not controlled by (i ,j), Candidate 1 can then adjust positions on 
the public issues away from the median voter's optimum values and 
still capture the election as long as th,e reductions in welfare so 
induced do not offset the reductions in bureaucratic costs that 
are made possible by the candidate's greater influence. The 
k smaller is p
j 
for all candidates, the smaller is the expected cost 
of a suboptimal K
j 
and hence the greater is the extent to which 
the value of K
j 
proposed by candidate 1 can diverge from the optimum 
b and still not offset the effects of differences in I
j
. 
Of course , the optimum values of K
j 
and Fij 
for the 
median voter are not the same for both candidates. For any 
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given K
j
' Fij
' B and X, the price of Kj is lower if an incumbent 
is elected than if the.challenger wins since the former offers 
more effective facilitation services, Equations (12), (13) and 
(14), wh�n combined, yield: 
uij z 
uij K 
Since CBI < O, at equilibrium values of B ,  X and Fij 
for the 
challenger CB would be too small to be an equilibrium for the 
incumbent. Similarly, in equation (18), CF is too small, 
to be an 
equilibrium. To restore equilibrium for the median voter requires 
some combination of increasing B ,  which is achieved by increasing 
K and by substituting B for X, and increasing Fij 
since CFF > O. 
The implications of these results are several. First , 
incumbents who perform well as facilitators should defeat 
challengers unless they of fer outlandish positions on public 
policies. Second , incumbents should have a greater reelection 
advantage as government activity grows, assuming that c1B < Q, 
Third, because facilitation is financed from general tax revenues, 
voters use too much of it. Consequently, the equilibrium amount 
of public activity for a candidate to offer is too great, and the 
advantage of incumbents in elections is larger than it would be if 
facilitation were appropriately priced. 
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If the legislature can structure itself and the 
bureaucracy so that incumbency becomes more important, it has an 
incentive to do so. The greater is the effect of incumbency on 
influence, the greater is the advantage of the incumbent in 
reducing bureaucratic costs and maximizing expected utility in 
comparison with the platform of a challenger in the next election. 
By· analogous reasoning, if a majority party can increase the extent 
to which membership in that party determines influence, it has 
an incentive to do so. 
Bureau-Maximizing Agencies 
The preceding sections presume that agencies are passive 
conduits for decisions by the legislature on the amount of public 
goods to be produced and the factor pr�portions to be used in 
producing them. Here this assumption is replaced by the hypothesis 
that agencies seek to maximize bureaucratic inputs to the 
production of public goods rather than total expenditures, as 
assumed by Niskanen (1971). For example, an agency which provides 
transfer payments might seek to increase contact between caseworkers 
and clients or the total caseload because both lead to greater 
nureaucratic input, while being less enthusiastic about proposals 
to 'provide across the board increases in payments. 
The structure of the civil service as described by 
Warner, et al (1963) provides the rationale for this model. Unlike 
market-oriented private organizations, neither government 
organizations nor the people who populate their hierarchies have 
2 1  
much opportunity for entrepreneurial gains. The main exception is 
that the number of civil service jobs at high grades, and the 
prestige and perquisites of politically appointed positions, depend 
in part upon the number of employees in the agency. A career 
employee can increase the chance for promotion to the highest civil 
se�vice grades, and a political appointee can increase the 
desirability of the job of agency head, by working to expand the 
size of the agency. This is done by increasing t'he amount of 
bureaucracy associated with existing programs and increasing the 
number and level of support of programs. 
Formally, the agency is seen as solving the following 
problem: 
Maximize: 
Subject to: PbB 
PK - PXx 
K � f (B,X) 
'The first-order conditions are: 
0 
0 
0 
Equation (2 2 )  permits analysis of the differences between 
dP 
monopolistic and competitive bureaus, depending on whether dK is 
(20) 
(2 1) 
(22) 
assumed to be negative or zero. The second-order conditions require 
that both A and y be positive; hence, a monopoly bureau will 
operate on the elastic portion of its demand curve. Furthermore, 
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bureaucratization (perhaps unmeasurable), which in turn will lead 
to greater success in seeking reelection by incumbents and greater 
devotion of legislators to facilitation services. 
No definitive empirical test of these propositions is 
offered here. To do so would require a sophisticated statistical 
analysis of the relationship between the electoral success of 
incumbents and numerous other factors, including the size of 
the bureaucracy and the devotion of the incumbent to constituent 
services. Still, rough trends in the United States indicate 
that a more detailed empirical investigation of the theoretical 
arguments advanced ln this paper is warranted. 
In the past few years, incumbents have enjoyed a growing 
advantage in American congressional elections.!!../ In 1976, only 
!!./ On the incumbency effect, see Erikson (1971); Mayhew (1974); 
Tufte (1972); Burnham (1964) and especially llerejohn (1977) 
who succeeds in dismissing the conventional explanations for 
the phenomenon. 
thirteen of the 385 members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
who sought reelection were defeated, and, including retirements, 
about 14 percent of the Congress turned over. A century ago, 
turnover rates were normally in the range of 40-50 percent, and 
occasionally were much higher (73 percent in 1842, 61 percent in 
1852). Since the late nineteenth century the involuntary turnover 
rate has sharply declined. The most recent decline occurred in 
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the late 1960s, following the implementation of the Great Society 
programs and despite the enactment of a very generous congressional 
retirement program that led to an increase in voluntary retirements 
of senior congrassmen. 
The congressional resources devoted to constituency 
services can be crudely measured by analyzing the records that 
Congress keeps with regard to the activities of representatives 
and their staffs, As Fiorina (1977) shows, these data reveal 
substantial increases in facilitation activities. For example, one 
measure of resources devoted to constituency service is the 
assignment of staff to district offices, where the principal 
activity is receiving complaints from constituents, rather than 
to the Washington, D.C. office, where legislative and other 
policy matters are dealt with, Between 1960 and 1974, the number 
of staff workers operating in .district offices rose from fewer 
than one per district in 1960 to about four per district in 1974.:!./ 
J__/ Fiorina (1977), pp, 56-60, 
Even if more refined empirical studies of the United 
States support the theory presented in this pape·r, other questions 
about the importance of the model remain. Growth in bureaucracy 
apparently is ubiquitous in democratic societies, Does the model 
simply isolate one among many sufficient conditions for bureaucratic 
growth, a condition which may hold only in the United States? 
A comparative study of western democracies offers an 
opportunity for providing some answers to the generality of the 
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model. All other things being equal, bureaucracy should grow more 
rapidly in countries that more closely approximate the governmental 
system assumed in the model • .§./ Abstracting from these cultural 
.§_/ Of course, other things are not equal; differences in cultural 
backgrounds, economic structure and other factors could be 
important in determining the mix of government act�vities 
that are und�rtaken, which in turn can lead to intercountry 
differences in the possibility of excessive bureaucratization. 
More socialistic societies, for example, can be expected 
to have more bureaucracy simply because a greater proportion 
of economic activity is controlled by government. 
effects, the model presented here suggests that countries in which 
legislators are elected at large and/or on the basis of proportional 
representation ought to exhibit less growth in bureaucracy, ceteris 
paribus, than countries in which legislators are selected from 
districts on the basis of vote plurality. For example Great 
Britain and France, with district representation, ought to exhibit 
the tendencies predicted by the model to a greater extent than 
should the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Austria and israel1 all'of which use proportional representation, 
Moreover, within West Germany's mixed legislature, representatives 
elected from districts ought to behave differently than legislators 
who are selected on the basis of proportional representation. 
The paper paints a pessimistic picture, indeed, about 
the likely success of a "good government" movement. Not only does 
the model pin ultimate responsibility for the expansion of 
bureaucracy on legislators, it further illustrates that neither 
legislators, voters nor agencies may have sufficient incentives 
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to take actions to reverse the trend. One can imagine the process 
continuing until members of the bureaucracy constitute the 
dominant political force, in which case maintaining the bureaucracy 
becomes an end of government rather than a means for retaining 
political power, The only barrier to this eventual result is that 
bureaucratic costs may become sufficiently large before bureaucrats 
attain a plurality that the gains from reform, even when multiplied 
by the tiny probability that a single legislator will succeed, 
exceed the value of a good facilitator. Perhaps the finding of 
.Kaufman (1976) �hat government agencie� .£_an become sufficiently 
ineffective that the legislature will ki.11 them off provides 
support for the latter possibility. 
28 
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